






















































SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2016-007 
 
 






* Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 





SFB 649, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 

















































In light of persistent inflation dispersion and high debt levels in the EMU, this
paper investigates the desirability of budget-neutral fiscal policy rules that respond to
the domestic inflation differential. The paper employs a two-country DSGE model of
a monetary union with traded and non-traded goods. When consumption or labour
income taxes respond to the domestic inflation differential while lump-sum taxes bal-
ance the budget, a national fiscal authority is able to reduce welfare costs of business
cycle fluctuations by 1-4%. When lump-sum taxes are absent, hybrid rules using
only distortionary taxes can reduce welfare costs by 6-10% under demand and sup-
ply disturbances. Gains in welfare stem from higher mean consumption due to lower
price dispersion when the fiscal authority actively compresses the domestic inflation
differential and thus domestic inflation.
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1 Introduction
During the 2000s, European countries’ inflation rates have been characterised by a high
degree of heterogeneity. Prior to the introduction of the Euro, countries with tradition-
ally higher inflation rates managed to lower them in order to comply with the Maastricht
criteria. In the early years of the Euro, nominal convergence seemed to be attained.1 How-
ever as documented by Rabanal (2009), the years that followed showed a trend reversal.
Specifically, inflation rates in the southern European periphery consistently exceeded the
average Euro area inflation rate leading to significant real appreciations and the often-
mentioned loss of competitiveness. Deviations of the domestic inflation rate from the
union-wide average, or in other words inflation differentials, are not necessarily an un-
desirable phenomenon in a monetary union. Since the nominal exchange rate is fixed,
inflation differentials are the naturtal by-product of asymmetric shocks and part of the
adjustment mechanism. They do pose a problem however for the conduct of monetary
policy. Consider a country whose inflation rate is above the union-wide inflation rate. The
nominal interest rate set by the centralised monetary authority does not increase as much
as the Taylor principle would usually prescribe. The country’s inflation rate enters the
aggregate union-wide inflation rate with a certain weight so that the Central Bank only
partially responds to the increase in inflation in that country, a fact commonly known as
one size does not fit all. Moreover, inflation differentials are particularly problematic if
they are highly persistent as observed in the Euro area after the introduction of the Euro.
The persistent deviations from the union-wide inflation rate lead to a large divergence
in competitiveness and are followed by a harmful re-adjustment period for the countries
whose real exchange rate strongly appreciated.2
Since the centralised monetary policy cannot address the heterogeneity across member
countries’ inflation rates, various articles ask what role could be assigned to national fiscal
policies in mitigating differences in inflation rates and in how far such a policy would be
desirable. This paper seeks to add to the existing discussion on fiscal feedback to national
differences by analysing the effectiveness of fiscal tax rules that strategically react to the
domestic inflation differential as a stabilising policy.3 Kirsanova et al. (2007) find that fis-
cal feedback to differences in inflation rates are welfare-improving compared to fiscal rules
responding to domestic output or the terms of trade only. In their New Keynesian model
of a monetary union with two countries, feedback comes through government spending
which is financed by government debt and constant taxes on labour income. Similarly,
Beetsma and Jensen (2005) work with government purchases as the fiscal instrument fi-
nanced by either lump-sum taxes or government debt. Moreover, Vogel et al. (2013)
study various tax instruments in their fiscal rules also allowing for government debt. Both
works find gains from responding to deviations in the terms of trade. Positive analyses
of Duarte and Wolman (2002, 2008) add to the discussion by including a non-tradeable
1 See Rogers (2007) who argues that nominal convergence across the Euro area has been achieved already
in the 90’s.
2 A large amount of research has been dedicated to identify the drivers of the inflation differentials
across EMU countries. Prominent hypotheses were a catching-up process as described in Balassa (1964)
and Samuelson (1964), differences in institutions/rigidities or demand-driven effects. A non-exhaustive
overview of research in that field contains López-Salido et al. (2005), Canzoneri et al. (2006), Angeloni and
Ehrmann (2007), Andrés et al. (2008), Rabanal (2009), Altissimo et al. (2011) and Morsy and Jaumotte
(2012).
3 Considering the inflation differential, i.e. the difference of a country’s domestic inflation to that of the
union, as the fiscal target has the straightforward advantage that it is easy to measure in a monetary
union with several member states. Indicators such as terms of trade or differences in inflation rates are
more difficult to apply in a framework of more than two countries such as the EMU.
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goods producing sector in the model of the monetary union. Including non-traded varieties
extends the scope for large and persistent price and thus inflation differentials. They show
that a fiscal authority can successfully compress inflation differentials via a fiscal rule for
’pro-cyclical’ labour income taxes. A labour income tax that is lowered in response to a
positive domestic inflation differential, i.e. when the domestic inflation rate is above the
union-wide average, compresses inflation differentials, yet volatility of domestic inflation
might increase.
The existing studies focus on non-distortionary instruments and allow the issuance of
public debt to finance the fiscal intervention. In the European context however, it is par-
ticularly interesting to inspect bugdet-neutral fiscal rules that abstract from the issuance
of new public debt. The Southern periphery of the Euro area experienced a rise in the
levels of public debt rendering debt-financed policies that target inflation differentials pos-
sibly not attainable. In that respect, this paper adds to the existing literature by explicitly
considering budget-neutral policies and works along the lines of a large body of research
studying the optimal conduct of fiscal policy via simple rules in a monetary union.4 Ad-
ditionally, this paper is related to the literature concerned with fiscal devaluations as it
considers budget-neutral policies which became explicitly relevant in the context of the
European debt crisis. Prominent works in this field by von Thadden and Lipinska (2013),
Farhi et al. (2014) and Engler et al. (2014) investigate the effectiveness of a unilateral tax
shift to boost competitiveness of a member country of a monetary union. The distinguish-
ing aspect between the literature on fiscal devaluations and the analysis performed in this
paper is the focus on temporary tax shifts in response to contemporaneous discrepancies
in the domestic and the union-wide inflation rate instead of permanent tax shifts.
Specifically, this paper analyses the effectiveness of four fiscal rules in reducing welfare
costs arising from business cycle fluctuations. As tax instruments the analysis considers
consumption, labour income and lump-sum taxes that potentially balance the fiscal bud-
get. Consumption taxes in the form of value-added taxes have been one of the prominent
fiscal instruments being adjusted during the Financial as well as the European crisis in
several European countries and thus represent a natural candidate for a fiscal tax rule to
examine. Labour income taxes are considered to determine the benefits from using this
instrument which have been suggested but not quantified by Duarte and Wolman (2008).
The welfare analysis suggests that consumption (labour income) taxes should be raised
(lowered) when domestic inflation exceeds the union-wide average. Second, the fiscal rules
for which lump-sum taxes balance the budget are able to reduce welfare costs of busi-
ness cycle fluctuations by 1-4%. They do so, by reducing the volatility of the inflation
differential and domestic inflation which lowers mean price dispersion and raises mean
consumption. Interestingly, hybrid rules where also the fiscal budget is financed by a
distortionary tax are able to outperform the former and reduce welfare costs by 6-10%
under the full stochastic setup. This is because they can combine the benefits of the rules
relying on lump-sum financing when the two tax instruments move in opposite directions
to compress inflationary responses most effectively.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the set-up of the model and the channels
through which inflation differentials arise. After declaring the baseline calibration in sec-
tion 3, section 4 performs a welfare analysis for the four fiscal rules which are investigated.
This section also presents the welfare gains or losses from the fiscal rules conditional on
the shock specification and discusses impulse-response functions to compare the dynamics
4 Additional to the works mentioned above one has to name Lombardo and Sutherland (2004), Beetsma
and Jensen (2004, 2005), Pappa and Vassilatos (2007), Gali and Monacelli (2008), Ferrero (2009) and
Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2012) as notable advances in that research area.
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of the model under the different fiscal rules to the baseline in which distortionary taxes
are constant. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model is similar to that of Duarte and Wolman (2008) and consists of two countries of
equal size, Home (H) and Foreign (F ), which constitute a monetary union. Each country
is populated by a measure one of households which have access to an internationally traded
asset. In each country there is a sector producing tradeable goods which are traded within
the monetary union. There is also a sector producing non-tradeable goods which can only
be consumed by domestic households and the domestic government. Both countries are
subject to nominal rigidities in the goods market in both sectors. The model abstracts
from migration, i.e. labour is immobile across countries. Within a country though, labour
is assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors.
The following paragraphs describe the set-up of the Home economy. The structure of
the Foreign economy is analogous if not explicitly stated otherwise. Foreign variables are
denoted by an asterisk.
2.1 Households




βk [U(Ct+k)− V (Lt+k)]
where E denotes the expectations operator and β ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor. Households
derive utility from consumption Ct and disutility from supplying labour Lt.
The aggregate consumption index Ct is composed of consumption of tradeable, CT , and

















The elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods is expressed by ι and
δ denotes the steady state share of non-tradeable goods in the aggregate consumption
index. The price of the final consumption good is given by
Pt =
[





where PT and PN denote the prices of traded and non-traded goods. Households choose
the optimal allocation of consumption expenditures across different types of goods. The
optimisation yields the following demand functions












Households have access to a riskless internationally traded bond Bt which pays out the
gross nominal interest rate Rt in t + 1. In line with von Thadden and Lipinska (2013),
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households pay a consumption tax τCt on their consumption, a labour income tax τ
L
t on
their labour income and lump-sum taxes denoted by τ lumpt . The intertemporal budget
constraint expressed in real terms is given by






+ Πt + (1− τLt )wtLt − τ
lump
t
where wt stands for the real wage in the economy and Πt for profit transfers from the
ownership of domestic firms. The wage is identical across sectors within the economy
due to the assumption of perfect labour mobility across sectors and the absence of wage
rigidities.
The optimal paths of Ct and Lt are described by the set of optimality conditions derived
from the utility maximisation problem of the households. The labour supply decision and
the intertemporal Euler equation are given by
(1− τLt )Wt















denotes gross consumer price inflation net of taxes.
2.2 Firms
In both sectors, intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms.
Retailers use intermediate varieties as input for the production of final goods.
2.2.1 Retailers
Retailers in both sectors are perfectly competitive and combine intermediate goods to








where ε is the elasticity of substitution across
different varieties YN (i) of the non-tradeable good. Given the technology, retailers in the



















In the traded sector, retailers combine intermediate home and foreign produced traded
goods, YH,t(i) and YF,t(i), to produce the final traded good YT consumed by domestic











































where ϕ is the elasticity of substitution between final home and foreign traded goods in
the production of YT and ω stands for the steady state share of imported goods in the
final traded good. Home bias for home produced traded goods is present when ω < 0.5.
The profit maximisation yields the demand functions
















where PH,t(i) and PF,t(i) are the prices of the home and foreign traded variety i and where





















2.2.2 Intermediate goods producing firms
In each sector there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by i,
i ∈ [0, 1], which set their prices in a Calvo fashion. The firms produce intermediate goods
varieties using a linear production technology and sector- and country-specific technology
ZS , S ∈ [T,N ].
In the non-tradeable goods sector an intermediate goods producing firm i produces with
YN,t(i) = exp(ZN,t)LN,t(i)
and seeks to maximise its expected profit given that with probability θ the firm is not able
















is the stochastic discount factor, YN,t+k|t(i) output
of firm i in t+ k given the price set in t and Wt the nominal wage.
The set-up and maximisation problem of an intermediate goods producing firm in the
traded sector is analogous. Intermediate goods in the traded sector in the home economy
are produced by some firm i via the production function
YH,t(i) = exp(ZT,t)LT,t(i).









given that with probability θ the firm cannot readjust its price.
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2.2.3 Terms of trade
Due to the presence of the non-traded goods sector, the model includes external and
internal terms of trade. The external terms of trade Tt are defined as the price of foreign





A rise in the terms of trade ameliorates the trade position of the home economy as the
foreign produced traded goods become relatively more expensive. The internal terms of








and measure the internal competitiveness across sectors within a country. They capture
the price of the non-traded good relative to the final traded good within a member country
of the union.
2.3 Policy makers
2.3.1 Central monetary authority
Monetary policy is conducted at the union-level. Following von Thadden and Lipinska
(2013), the central bank sets the union-wide gross nominal interest Rt in response to
union-wide average consumer price inflation net of taxes πUt = 0.5πt + 0.5π
∗
t . The Taylor-







where φ captures the rigorousness of the central bank.
2.3.2 Fiscal authority
In both countries the government consumes non-tradeable varieties and the stream of
public consumption relative to total GDP within a country follows an exogenous process
of the form
(Gt/Yt) = (Ḡ/Ȳ ) + ρg(Gt−1/Yt−1) + εG,t
where |ρG| < 1 and εG,t ∼ N (0, σ2G). The government uses its available tax income to
finance its expenditures. The budget constraint of the fiscal authority reads
τ lumpt + τ
C
t Ct + τ
L
t wtLt = Gt.
The analysis is concerned with quantifying the gains in welfare when the home economy
strategically reacts to variations in its domestic inflation differential with one of its avail-
able tax instruments. In order to identify the effects of a specific fiscal rule of the home
economy, it is assumed that the foreign economy keeps its distortionary taxes constant.
That is, the budget of the foreign fiscal authority is balanced by lump-sum taxes so that








where bar-variables denote deterministic steady state values.
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2.4 Market clearing and equilibrium
The market clearing conditions for traded and non-traded goods, the labour market and
the international bond market are given by
YT,t = CT,t,





Bt = −B∗t .
To close the model, a debt-elastic interest rate as proposed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2003) is incorporated to induce stationarity on private debt. For the impulse response
functions the model is approximated linearly around a zero-inflation steady state.
2.5 Sources of inflation differentials
From the definition of the price of consumption in H, Pt, and its analogue for country F ,
P ∗t , one can decompose the different sources of consumer price differentials which translate
to differences in inflation rates. To begin with, the ratio of aggregate consumer prices of







1− δ + δT 1−ιN,t




Neglecting the ratio of traded goods prices for a moment, it is easily seen that the presence
of non-traded goods (δ 6= 0) is an essential source for price (inflation) differentials. Non-
traded goods prices are not in direct competition across countries. Hence, different prices
for non-tradeable goods translate into differing internal terms of trade across countries.
These lead to price differentials even if the price indices for the final traded good would
be identical across countries, i.e. PT,t = P
∗
T,t.
Going one step further one can analyse in how far inflation differentials might arise from





(1− ω)P 1−ϕH,t + ωP
1−ϕ
F,t





which shows in how far the presence of home or foreign bias is essential in creating price
differentials. Under ω = 0.5, when home bias is absent, traded goods price indices would
be identical across countries. With a bias when ω 6= 0.5, price (and inflation) differentials
work through the external terms of trade, i.e. the relative price of foreign to home produced
traded goods. Note that neither of the two channels described above rely on the inclusion
of rigid prices.
3 Calibration
This section presents the benchmark parameter values of the model. The calibration is
symmetric across countries and one model period corresponds to one quarter.
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3.1 Private sector








where σ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion and κ the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labour supply. The discount factor β takes a standard value of 0.99 while the
coefficient of relative risk aversion σ as well as the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour
supply κ is set equal to one (log-utility in consumption).
As in Duarte and Wolman (2008), the share of non-tradeable goods in the consumption
basket δ takes a value of 0.4 and the elasticities of substitution ι, ϕ and ε are set to 0.74,
1.5 and 10 respectively. In contrast to these authors, the calibration allows for home bias
in the production of the final traded good and sets ω = 0.4. The Calvo parameter θ
is assumed to be identical across sectors and countries. The expected price lifetime is 3
quarters such that θ = 2/3 which is close to estimates by Druant et al. (2012) who find for
a sample of 17 European countries that on average prices remain unchanged for around
10 months.
3.2 Public sector
Monetary policy is characterised by a standard Taylor coefficient of φ = 1.5. For the
fiscal side this work follows von Thadden and Lipinska (2013) and Duarte and Wolman
(2008) by assuming a steady state consumption tax rate τ̄C of 15% and a steady state
labour income tax rate τ̄L of 18%. In order to comply with the budget constraint of the
government, the steady state share of public consumption relative to domestic GDP is set
to 27.13%.
3.3 Shock processes
The analysis uses the estimated shock processes and variance-covariances matrices of
Duarte and Wolman (2008) for the technology and government spending processes. Tech-
nology shocks follow an AR(1) process Zt = AZt−1 + εZ,t with covariance matrix Ω, where







0.708 0.169 0.006 −0.435
−0.023 0.707 −0.061 −0.038
0.006 −0.435 0.708 0.169





0.16 0.05 0.03 0
0.05 0.06 0 0
0.03 0 0.16 0.05
0 0 0.05 0.06
× 10−3.
Shocks to the share of government consumption of output follow independent AR(1) pro-





In order to understand whether a fiscal tax rule that responds to the domestic inflation
differential can be welfare-improving, this section determines and compares the welfare
costs of business cycle fluctuations under different tax regimes for a given union-wide
monetary policy. The welfare analysis follows the framework of Lucas (1987, 2003) and
computes a consumption compensation v that a household would be willing to pay to avoid
moving from being in the deterministic steady state to being in the stochastic environment.




βt[U(Ct)− V (Lt)] =
∞∑
t=0
βt[U((1 + v)C̄)− V (L̄)]
where bar-variables denote the deterministic steady state of the model’s variables. The
unconditional expectation of the household’s lifetime utility in the ergodic distribution of
the model must be equal to the lifetime utility of the household in the deterministic steady
state paying the consumption compensation v. Using a second-order Taylor approximation
on both sides one can express v as a function of first and second order moments of the
ergodic distribution of consumption and hours. v can be decomposed into four components
v = vmeanC + vmeanL + vvolatilityC + vvolatilityL
which allows to inspect the contributions of mean effects being the difference between the
mean in the ergodic distribution of the model and the deterministic steady state ( vmeanC
and vmeanL) and volatility effects (vvolatilityC and vvolatilityL).
5 In order to accurately
calculate the moments of the ergodic distribution the model is written recursively and
solved in Dynare using a second-order accurate perturbation. This paper employs the
method developed by Lan and Meyer-Gohde (2013) to find accurate first- and second-
order moments analytically.
The paper considers four tax regimes of fiscal feedback to the domestic inflation differential:
a responsive consumption or labour income tax where the fiscal budget is balanced by
lump-sum taxes, (1) and (2), or when the fiscal budget has to be balanced by the remaining
distortionary tax, (3) and (4). The regimes take the following forms
(1) τLt = τ̄





(2) τCt = τ̄



















where ζ denotes the elasticity of the tax rate with respect to the inflation differential(
lnπt − lnπUt
)
, i.e. when domestic inflation is one percentage point above the union-wide
aggregate the tax rate increases by ζ percentage points.
Those four scenarios are compared to a baseline economy with ζ = 0, i.e. with constant
distortionary taxes, and where the fiscal budget is balanced by lump-sum taxes to evaluate
the desirability of the fiscal rules. The analysis varies the policy parameter ζ over a grid
and searches for the ζ at which welfare losses are minimised relative to the benchmark.
Figure 1 displays the welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations for different ζ relative to
5 An explicit derivation of the welfare measure for the given utility function can be found in the appendix.
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Figure 1: Welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations for different values of ζ relative to constant
distortionary taxes when the budget is financed exclusively by lump-sum taxes (=100) for the four
fiscal rules.
Note: Rule (3) and (4) do not cross the benchmark intersection at ζ = 0 because they abstract from
lump-sum taxes. For instance, for rule (3) when consumption taxes are constant at ζ = 0 labour
income taxes have to balance the fiscal budget and vice versa. The fluctuations of the distortionary
labour income tax cause different welfare costs than if lump-sum taxes would balance the budget.
As a consequence, at ζ = 0 welfare costs of rule (3) and (4) are different from 100.
the baseline scenario. For each scenario there exists a point at which welfare losses are
minimised relative to constant distortionary taxes. Rule (1) and (3) display a minimum
at positive values for ζ, i.e. at the optimum of these rules the consumption taxes should
be raised in response to a domestic inflation rate that is above the union average. The
optima of rule (2) and (4) on the other hand are attained at a negative value for ζ which is
in line with the analysis of Duarte and Wolman (2008) who discussed a pro-cyclical labour
income tax. Ideally, labour income taxes should be lowered in response to a positive
domestic inflation differential.
Table 1 displays the relative gains of the fiscal rules to the baseline at their respective
optimum, ζ∗, for the four different scenarios.6 In all cases the majority of the welfare
costs arise in the mean component of consumption, vmeanC , due to differences of mean
consumption in the ergodic distribution of the model to the level of consumption in the
6 Note that the optimal tax elasticities seem unrealistically high, especially for rule (3). This can be
largely explained by the model setup considering two countries of equal size. In order to create an
inflation differential of 1% the model needs strong variations in the domestic inflation rate as the union-
wide aggregate partly comoves with domestic inflation, ceteris paribus. The large disturbances necessary
to create such sizable inflation differentials justify the size of the optimal tax elasticities.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
(ζ∗ = 6) (ζ∗ = −5) (ζ∗ = 11) (ζ∗ = −3)
baseline responsive ∆% responsive ∆% responsive ∆% responsive ∆%
Welfare loss of fluctuations -1.0378 -0.9945 4.17 -1.0188 1.83 -0.9276 10.62 -0.9652 6.99
Decomposition:
vmeanC : -0.7694 -0.6787 8.74 -0.6845 8.17 -0.7435 2.50 -0.6451 11.98
vmeanL: -0.0825 -0.1375 -5.30 -0.1344 -5.00 0.0047 8.40 -0.0100 6.99
vvolatilityC : -0.0422 -0.0696 -2.63 -0.0446 -0.23 -0.1515 -10.52 -0.2930 -24.16
vvolatilityL: -0.1437 -0.1087 3.36 -0.1552 -1.11 -0.0373 10.25 -0.0172 12.18
Moments:
mean consumption 0.6833 0.6834 0.01 0.6834 0.01 0.6833 0.00 0.6834 0.01
mean hours 0.9385 0.9386 0.01 0.9386 0.01 0.9384 -0.01 0.9384 -0.01
mean price disp. (T) 1.0009 1.0007 -0.01 1.0007 -0.02 1.0008 -0.01 1.0005 -0.03
mean price disp. (N) 1.0005 1.0004 -0.01 1.0004 -0.01 1.0006 0.01 1.0002 -0.03
std. dev. consumption 0.0063 0.0081 28.58 0.0064 2.82 0.0119 89.86 0.0165 164.22
std. dev. hours 0.0169 0.0147 -13.00 0.0176 3.95 0.0086 -49.03 0.0059 -65.39
std. dev. CPI inflation 0.0035 0.0033 -6.09 0.0033 -7.12 0.0040 13.53 0.0028 -21.66
std. dev. inflation diff. 0.0015 0.0014 -5.52 0.0013 -12.20 0.0014 -7.87 0.0013 -16.77
std. dev. cons. tax - 0.0085 - - - 0.0153 - 0.0272 -
std. dev. labour tax - - - 0.0066 - 0.0141 - 0.0038 -
std. dev. lump-sum tax 0.0155 0.0149 -3.87 0.0185 19.35 - - - -
Table 1: Welfare costs ×10−3, theoretical moments and percentage gains and differences under the
welfare-maximising tax rule (responsive) relative to constant taxes (baseline).
deterministic steady state.7 Considering rules (1) and (2), the responsive consumption
tax performs better at the optimum than the labour income tax. In both cases the bulk
of the welfare gain originates in the mean component of consumption, i.e. by actively
compressing inflation and inflation differentials, the fiscal authority compresses the level
of price dispersion and thus increases mean consumption in the ergodic distribution of
the model. Both hybrid rules that abstract from lump-sum taxes outperform rules (1)
and (2). Welfare costs are minimised to the largest extent under rule (3) where labour
income taxes balance the budget. Under both hybrid rules only the volatility component
of consumption suffers while the remaining components of the welfare costs gain.
The picture drawn by table 1 suggests that the hybrid rules can outperform the rules
where the budget is balanced by lump-sum taxes. This result might however hinge on
the type of shock causing the inflation differential. The following paragraphs repeat the
previous analysis for the complete shock structure specified in the calibration as well as
for technology or government spending shocks only for each rule to assess the robustness
of the previous findings. The mechanism for each rule is discussed using impulse response
functions after shocks to domestic government spending and productivity in the non-traded
sector so that the inflation differential of the home economy is 0.1 percentage points on
impact. Spill-overs to other sector’s technology have been shut off for the impulse response
functions. Since the rules work similar under both types of technology shocks only the
7 The welfare costs in the mean component of consumption, i.e. the difference between the unconditional
expectation of consumption in the ergodic distribution and its deterministic steady state, arise as follows.
Following an exogenous disturbance only a fraction of firms can adjust their prices due to the Calvo-
pricing mechanism. This partial adjustment of the price level leads to price dispersion across different
varieties of goods produced by the continuum of intermediate goods producing firms. The larger the
response of inflation the wider is the underlying dispersion across prices. Price dispersion causes an
inefficient allocation of resources as retailers use different quantities of the available varieties to produce
the final good. The inefficiency in the production process of the final good ultimately results in a lower
mean of consumption in the ergodic distribution of the model.
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Complete shock Technology Government spending
structure shocks only shocks only
baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆%
Welfare loss of fluctuations -1.0378 -0.9945 4.17 -0.5555 -0.5353 3.63 -0.4820 -0.4588 4.79
Decomposition:
vmeanC : -0.7694 -0.6787 8.74 -0.4834 -0.4290 9.80 -0.2860 -0.2497 7.53
vmeanL: -0.0825 -0.1375 -5.30 -0.0293 -0.0549 -4.60 -0.0532 -0.0826 -6.11
vvolatilityC : -0.0422 -0.0696 -2.63 -0.0326 -0.0473 -2.63 -0.0094 -0.0221 -2.64
vvolatilityL: -0.1437 -0.1087 3.36 -0.0101 -0.0042 1.06 -0.1334 -0.1044 6.01
Moments:
mean consumption 0.6833 0.6834 0.01 0.6835 0.6835 0.01 0.6836 0.6837 0.01
mean hours 0.9385 0.9386 0.01 0.9385 0.9385 0.00 0.9385 0.9385 0.00
mean price disp. (T) 1.0009 1.0007 -0.01 1.0006 1.0005 -0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.00
mean price disp. (N) 1.0005 1.0004 -0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01
std. dev. consumption 0.0063 0.0081 28.58 0.0055 0.0066 20.42 0.0030 0.0045 53.47
std. dev. hours 0.0169 0.0147 -13.00 0.0045 0.0029 -35.39 0.0163 0.0145 -11.53
std. dev. CPI inflation 0.0035 0.0033 -6.09 0.0026 0.0024 -6.72 0.0024 0.0023 -5.37
std. dev. inflation diff. 0.0015 0.0014 -5.52 0.0011 0.0011 -5.47 0.0010 0.0009 -5.57
std. dev. cons. tax - 0.0085 - - 0.0064 - - 0.0056 -
std. dev. labour tax - - - - - - - - -
std. dev. lump-sum tax 0.0155 0.0149 -3.87 0.0027 0.0055 103.07 0.0152 0.0139 -8.55
Table 2: Welfare costs ×10−3, theoretical moments and percentage gains and differences under rule
(1) at ζ∗ = 6 (responsive) relative to constant distortionary taxes (baseline) by shock specification.
impulse response function to non-traded technology will be discussed.
4.1 Rule (1) by shock specification
Table 2 displays the decomposition of the gains in welfare from the consumption tax rule
when lump-sum taxes balance the budget conditional on the shock specification, i.e. under
the complete shock structure as well as under technology or government spending shocks
only. Rule (1) performs along similar lines under demand as well as supply disturbances
as in both cases, the highest gain stems from the mean component of consumption while
mean hours and consumption volatility effects lower the benefits from the consumption
tax rule.
The benefits of raising the consumption tax in response to a positive domestic inflation
differential can be explained using impulse response functions displayed in the appendix.
Figure 2 displays the impulse response functions of key variables of the model to a shock
to technology in the non-traded sector for the baseline as well as under the responsive
consumption tax rule (ζ∗ = 6). The increase in productivity triggers a fall in marginal
costs of the firms producing non-traded varieties so that these firms seek to lower prices.
Non-traded goods become relatively cheaper than traded goods so the internal terms of
trade fall. Firms in the non-traded sector lower their demand for labour causing a fall in
the domestic nominal wage and the marginal costs of also the intermediate firms in the
traded sector. They can lower their prices as well which improves the external terms of
trade. Consumer price inflation falls below the union-average and the home economy faces
a negative inflation differential.
[Figure 2 here]
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Under rule (1) the consumption tax is lowered in response to the negative inflation differ-
ential so that consumption increases by more due to lower prices and taxes on consumption
goods. The increase in domestic demand is met by a stronger increase in production which
drives up marginal costs of all firms causing them to lower prices by less. As a consequence,
the response of CPI inflation and the inflation differential is slightly dampened. The im-
pulse response functions confirm the observations from table 2 that rule (1) is able to
dampen the responses of hours, CPI inflation and the domestic inflation differential while
raising the volatility of consumption. The compression of inflation lowers mean price dis-
persion explaining the large gain from the mean component of consumption.
A government spending shock increases the demand for non-traded goods such that firms in
this sector increase their production as displayed in figure 3. Marginal costs rise and firms
in the non-traded sector seek to increase their prices. The internal terms of trade increase.
Higher non-traded output increases the demand for labour and thus the economy-wide
wage driving up marginal costs of firms and thus also prices in the traded sector. Relative
to foreign produced traded goods, home produced traded goods become more expensive
displayed by the deterioration of the external terms of trade. Overall, inflation increases
relative to the union and the economy faces a positive inflation differential.
[Figure 3 here]
Under rule (1), consumption taxes increase leading to a more pronounced fall in domestic
consumption due to higher prices as well as consumption taxes. As a result, firms in
the non-traded sector raise their production by less after the government spending shock.
Marginal costs, the demand for labour and the nominal wage increase by less. The policy
dampens the response of CPI inflation and thus the inflation differential.
Again, the impulse response functions confirm the picture drawn by table 2. Under the
government spending shock, the responsive consumption tax slightly compresses inflation
responses as well as the response of hours but raises the volatility of consumption. The
compression of inflation gives smaller room for price dispersion, explaining the gain arising
in the mean consumption component.
4.2 Rule (2) by shock specification
In contrast to rule (1), rule (2) does not perform equally well under supply and demand
disturbances. Table 3 shows that the responsive labour income tax rule raises welfare
costs for the given sensitivity when only government spending shocks are present in the
model. Under technology shocks, the benefits from rule (2) arise both from mean effects
in consumption and hours while volatility effects slightly hamper the benefits. Under gov-
ernment spending shocks, a gain still arises in the mean component of consumption but
is outweighed by a large loss in the mean component of hours.
Figure 4 illustrates the mechanism of the fiscal rule for labour income taxes when respond-
ing to an inflation differential caused by a shock to non-traded sector technology relative
to the baseline discussed earlier.
[Figure 4 here]
In response to the negative inflation differential the labour income tax is raised. The
nominal wage increases to satisfy the labour supply decision of the household raising
marginal costs in both sectors and so that firms lower their prices by less. The smaller
fall in prices dampens the increase in domestic demand so that firms’ output increases by
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Complete shock Technology Government spending
structure shocks only shocks only
baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆%
Welfare loss of fluctuations -1.0378 -1.0188 1.83 -0.5555 -0.5115 7.93 -0.4820 -0.5070 -5.20
Decomposition:
vmeanC : -0.7694 -0.6845 8.17 -0.4834 -0.4259 10.36 -0.2860 -0.2587 5.66
vmeanL: -0.0825 -0.1344 -5.00 -0.0293 -0.0348 -0.99 -0.0532 -0.0996 -9.63
vvolatilityC : -0.0422 -0.0446 -0.23 -0.0326 -0.0346 -0.35 -0.0094 -0.0098 -0.09
vvolatilityL: -0.1437 -0.1552 -1.11 -0.0101 -0.0162 -1.09 -0.1334 -0.1389 -1.15
Moments:
mean consumption 0.6833 0.6834 0.01 0.6835 0.6835 0.01 0.6836 0.6837 0.00
mean hours 0.9385 0.9386 0.01 0.9385 0.9385 0.00 0.9385 0.9385 0.01
mean price disp. (T) 1.0009 1.0007 -0.02 1.0006 1.0005 -0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01
mean price disp. (N) 1.0005 1.0004 -0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01
std. dev. consumption 0.0063 0.0064 2.82 0.0055 0.0057 3.00 0.0030 0.0030 2.22
std. dev. hours 0.0169 0.0176 3.95 0.0045 0.0057 26.39 0.0163 0.0167 2.05
std. dev. CPI inflation 0.0035 0.0033 -7.12 0.0026 0.0024 -7.68 0.0024 0.0022 -6.45
std. dev. inflation diff. 0.0015 0.0013 -12.20 0.0011 0.0010 -12.22 0.0010 0.0009 -12.17
std. dev. cons. tax - - - - - - - - -
std. dev. labour tax - 0.0066 - - 0.0050 - - 0.0044 -
std. dev. lump-sum tax 0.0155 0.0185 19.35 0.0027 0.0043 59.26 0.0152 0.0180 18.42
Table 3: Welfare costs ×10−3, theoretical moments and percentage gains and differences under
rule (2) at ζ∗ = −5 (responsive) relative to constant distortionary taxes (baseline) by shock speci-
fication.
less under the responsive fiscal rule. As reported in table 3, the volatility of CPI inflation
and the inflation differential is lowered leading to lower price dispersion in expectations.
Figure 5 repeats the analysis for a government spending shock and shows that firms in the
non-traded sector still increase their production but lower labour income taxes lead to a
smaller increase in the nominal wage.
[Figure 5 here]
As a consequence, marginal costs in both sectors increase by less causing a smaller response
of inflation under the responsive fiscal rule displayed as well by the lower volatility of the
inflation variables in table 3.
4.3 Rule (3) by shock specification
The previous paragraphs established the benefits from raising (lowering) consumption
(labour income) taxes in response to a positive domestic inflation differential and their
dependence on the shock structure. It remains to clarify in how far the hybrid rules are
able to outperform the previously discussed rules that rely on lump-sum financing of the
fiscal budget.
Under rule (3) the fiscal authority raises the consumption tax while labour income taxes
balance the budget when domestic inflation exceeds the union-wide aggregate. Table 4
shows that rule (3) is beneficial under either shock structure at the given sensitivity. Un-
der technology shocks only, the gain in welfare stems largely from the mean component of
consumption from a lower degree of price dispersion while the volatility of consumption in-
creases. Despite a reduction of the welfare loss under government spending shocks though,
rule (3) destabilises inflation and the inflation differential and raises price dispersion.
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Complete shock Technology Government spending
structure shocks only shocks only
baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆%
Welfare loss of fluctuations -1.0378 -0.9276 10.62 -0.5555 -0.4656 16.18 -0.4820 -0.4615 4.24
Decomposition:
vmeanC : -0.7694 -0.7435 2.50 -0.4834 -0.4104 13.14 -0.2860 -0.3330 -9.77
vmeanL: -0.0825 0.0047 8.40 -0.0293 -0.0043 4.51 -0.0532 0.0090 12.89
vvolatilityC : -0.0422 -0.1515 -10.52 -0.0326 -0.0440 -2.05 -0.0094 -0.1071 -20.27
vvolatilityL: -0.1437 -0.0373 10.25 -0.0101 -0.0069 0.59 -0.1334 -0.0303 21.39
Moments:
mean consumption 0.6833 0.6833 0.00 0.6835 0.6836 0.01 0.6836 0.6836 0.00
mean hours 0.9385 0.9384 -0.01 0.9385 0.9384 -0.00 0.9385 0.9384 -0.01
mean price disp. (T) 1.0009 1.0008 -0.01 1.0006 1.0003 -0.03 1.0003 1.0004 0.02
mean price disp. (N) 1.0005 1.0006 0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01 1.0003 1.0004 0.02
std. dev. consumption 0.0063 0.0119 89.86 0.0055 0.0064 16.24 0.0030 0.0100 237.75
std. dev. hours 0.0169 0.0086 -49.03 0.0045 0.0037 -17.63 0.0163 0.0078 -52.34
std. dev. CPI inflation 0.0035 0.0040 13.53 0.0026 0.0024 -6.60 0.0024 0.0032 32.82
std. dev. inflation diff. 0.0015 0.0014 -7.87 0.0011 0.0008 -29.95 0.0010 0.0011 14.74
std. dev. cons. tax - 0.0153 - - 0.0087 - - 0.0125 -
std. dev. labour tax - 0.0141 - - 0.0074 - - 0.0119 -
std. dev. lump-sum tax 0.0155 - - 0.0027 - - 0.0152 - -
Table 4: Welfare costs ×10−3, theoretical moments and percentage gains and differences under rule
(3) at ζ∗ = 11 (responsive) relative to constant distortionary taxes (baseline) by shock specification.
In order to understand these findings, figure 6 displays the mechanism of rule (3) following
a technology shock in the non-traded sector.
[Figure 6 here]
As under rule (1) lowering of the consumption tax increases domestic demand, raising
production and marginal costs in both sectors so that domestic firms lower their prices by
less. At the same time, the labour income tax increases to finance the proportional increase
in government spending, letting the nominal wage increase which drives up marginal costs
even further. The response of domestic inflation is dampened to a large extent in response
to the domestic technology shock because the hybrid rule (3) combines the benefits of rule
(1) and (2). Consumption taxes fall while labour income taxes increase in response to the
domestic inflation differential making the hybrid rule so effective in light of technology
shocks.
Rule (3) works differently though for government spending shocks as displayed in figure
7. It prescribes an increase in consumption taxes but also labour income taxes increase to
finance public spending.
[Figure 7 here]
Private demand is drastically lowered and the nominal wage increases to make up for the
tax hikes raising marginal costs despite lower production. At the given sensitivity, CPI
inflation as well as the inflation differential react by more to the domestic government
spending shock explaining the higher volatility of these two variables in table 4. In contrast
to technology shocks, the compression of inflation under government spending shocks fails
due to the comovement of the two tax instruments.
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4.4 Rule (4) by shock specification
After establishing that the hybrid rule (3) can outperfom the rules relying on lump-sum
taxes when the tax instruments move in opposite direction it is to ask in how far rule (4)
compares to rule (3). Table 5 shows that similar to rule (3), rule (4) lowers welfare costs
of business cycle fluctuations under both demand and supply disturbances for the given
sensitivity. In contrast to rule (3) though, rule (4) successfully compresses inflation and
raises mean consumption under either shock structure. Figure 8 illustrates the working
Complete shock Technology Government spending
structure shocks only shocks only
baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆%
Welfare loss of fluctuations -1.0378 -0.9652 6.99 -0.5555 -0.5312 4.37 -0.4820 -0.4338 9.99
Decomposition:
vmeanC : -0.7694 -0.6451 11.98 -0.4834 -0.4790 0.80 -0.2860 -0.1661 24.87
vmeanL: -0.0825 -0.0100 6.99 -0.0293 -0.0141 2.74 -0.0532 0.0042 11.90
vvolatilityC : -0.0422 -0.2930 -24.16 -0.0326 -0.0280 0.84 -0.0094 -0.2649 -53.00
vvolatilityL: -0.1437 -0.0172 12.18 -0.0101 -0.0101 0.00 -0.1334 -0.0071 26.21
Moments:
mean consumption 0.6833 0.6834 0.01 0.6835 0.6835 0.00 0.6836 0.6837 0.01
mean hours 0.9385 0.9384 -0.01 0.9385 0.9385 -0.00 0.9385 0.9384 -0.01
mean price disp. (T) 1.0009 1.0005 -0.03 1.0006 1.0005 -0.01 1.0003 1.0000 -0.02
mean price disp. (N) 1.0005 1.0002 -0.03 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01 1.0003 1.0000 -0.02
std. dev. consumption 0.0063 0.0165 164.22 0.0055 0.0051 -7.41 0.0030 0.0157 431.17
std. dev. hours 0.0169 0.0059 -65.39 0.0045 0.0045 -0.07 0.0163 0.0038 -76.99
std. dev. CPI inflation 0.0035 0.0028 -21.66 0.0026 0.0024 -4.96 0.0024 0.0013 -46.71
std. dev. inflation diff. 0.0015 0.0013 -16.77 0.0011 0.0010 -9.35 0.0010 0.0007 -27.56
std. dev. cons. tax - 0.0272 - - 0.0046 - - 0.0268 -
std. dev. labour tax - 0.0038 - - 0.0031 - - 0.0022 -
std. dev. lump-sum tax 0.0155 - - 0.0027 - - 0.0152 - -
Table 5: Welfare costs ×10−3, theoretical moments and percentage gains and differences under
rule (4) at ζ∗ = −3 (responsive) relative to constant distortionary taxes (baseline) by shock speci-
fication.
of rule (4) for a shock to technology in the non-traded sector. As under rule (2), labour
income taxes increase, letting the nominal wage and marginal costs for domestic firms
increase which lower their prices by less.
[Figure 8 here]
Public spending increases proportionally at lower prices and higher labour tax income so
that consumption taxes decrease to balance the budget. As for rule (3), the large gains
arise because the two tax instruments move in opposite directions and thus combine the
benefits of rule (1) and (2) in compressing inflation.
Table 5 suggests that, in contrast to rule (3), rule (4) also compresses inflation under
government spending shocks only. Figure 9 shows that labour income taxes fall in response
to lower prices allowing for lower nominal wages and marginal costs so that firms raise
their prices by less.
[Figure 9 here]
At the same time, the increase in public spending is financed by higher consumption taxes
which lowers private demand giving further support for lower marginal costs due to less
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production. The result is a largely muted response of domestic inflation and and a damp-
ened inflation differential as suggested in table 5. Overall, the large reduction of welfare
costs of business cycle fluctuations under rule (4) under government spending shocks can,
as under technology shocks, be explained by the opposed movement of the two tax instru-
ments.
Comparing the hybrid rules, (3) and (4), with each other one can summarise the following
observations: despite a larger reduction of welfare costs under the complete shock struc-
ture as well as under technology shocks only under rule (3), rule (4) is able to compress
inflation differentials and raise mean consumption under either shock specification. Rule
(3) works along different lines under government spending shocks and actually raises in-
flation volatility and price dispersion. Under rule (4) all welfare costs components see a
gain except for the volatility of consumption while the mechanism of rule (3) is depen-
dent on the shock specification. To that end, rule (4) delivers a more robust stabilisation
mechanism.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates in how far a national fiscal authority should strategically react
to the domestic inflation differential with an available tax instrument. In a two-country
DSGE model with traded and non-traded goods, the analysis considers four fiscal rules,
responsive consumption and labour income taxes when the governmental budget is bal-
anced by lump-sum taxes or the remaining distortionary tax. It finds a large scope for
fiscal intervention. The welfare analysis shows that under demand as well as supply dis-
turbances all four rules reduce welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations relative to the
benchmark in which distortionary taxes are held constant. Under the full stochastic set-
up, both hybrid rules for which lump-sum taxes are absent outperform the rules relying
on lump-sum financing of government spending.
A robustness analysis discusses the dependence of the findings on the specified shock
structure. It finds that, except for the labour income tax rule under government spending
shocks only, all rules are beneficial under either type of disturbance, demand or supply
shocks. Comparing the performance of the two hybrid rules shows that letting labour in-
come taxes respond to the domestic inflation differential while consumption taxes balance
the budget delivers the most robust stabilisation mechanism. This is because under rule
(4) under both technology as well as government spending shocks the two tax instruments
move in opposite direction. This combines the benefits of the rules relying on lump-sum
financing so that inflation and inflation differentials are largely compressed and mean con-
sumption in the ergodic distribution is raised.
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Appendix
Derivation of the welfare measure
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+ (1 + v̄)−σC̄1−σ[v − v̄]
Note that in the deterministic steady state the consumption compensation should be zero,
i.e. v̄ = 0. Also, since the consumption compensation is constant there is no second
moment so the second order approximation bit has been left out. Rearrange to obtain
v = C̄−1E[Ct − C̄]︸ ︷︷ ︸
vmeanC












5.1 Impulse response functions
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions after a shock to ZN of one standard deviation. baseline =
solid line, responsive rule (1) = orange dotted line.
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions after a shock to G/Y of one standard deviation. baseline =
solid line, responsive rule (1) = orange dotted line.
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions after a shock to ZN of one standard deviation. baseline =
solid line, responsive rule (2) = orange dotted line.
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions after a shock to G/Y of one standard deviation. baseline =
solid line, responsive rule (2) = orange dotted line.
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions after a shock to ZN of one standard deviation. baseline =
solid line, responsive rule (3) = orange dotted line.
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions after a shock to G/Y of one standard deviation. baseline =
solid line, responsive rule (3) = orange dotted line.
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions after a shock to ZN of one standard deviation. baseline =
solid line, responsive rule (4) = orange dotted line.
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Figure 9: Impulse response functions after a shock to G/Y of one standard deviation. baseline =
solid line, responsive rule (4) = orange dotted line.
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